Employers In France May Inspect Employees’ Internet Connexions

Cour de Cassation (Social Chamber), 9 July 2008, Franck L. / Entreprise Martin, www.legalis.net


In this case, a company dismissed an employee on the grounds of a serious fault, after inspecting his computer and discovering that the employee had abusively consulted Internet websites for his personal use. As the inspection took place in his absence, the employee brought the case before the labour Court (‘Conseil de Prud’hommes’), claiming that his employee had infringed on his private life.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the dismissal was justified on the grounds of a serious fault.

The employee appealed to the Cour de Cassation (the French Supreme Court) claiming that in application of Articles 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (on the right to respect for private and family life), 9 of the Civil Code (on privacy) and L.120-2 of the Labour Code (on privacy at work; now codified at Article L. 1121-1), an employee is entitled to respect for his private life at his workplace, which obliges the employee to respect the secrecy of his communications. Therefore, the appellant considered that the employee could not inspect his computer without violating this fundamental liberty.

The employee further argued that, in any event, an employer is only entitled to look for the consulted Internet sites in the presence of the employee.

The French Cour de Cassation rejected these arguments, ruling that an employee’s connexions to Internet sites during his working hours, using a computer put at his disposal for the performance of his work, are presumed to be of a professional nature. An employer may therefore inspect these connexions in order to identify them, out of the employee’s presence.



BRAD SPITZ
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The Domain Name ‘elitemodelmanagement.eu’ Must Be Transferred To Elite

High Court of First Instance of Paris, Summary Order, 18 April 2008, Elite Model Management / P. D., World Scouting Model


A summary order of the High Court of First Instance of Paris dated 18 April 2008 ordered the transfer of the domain name ‘elitemodelmanagement.eu’ to Elite Model Management, the famous model agency established in France in 1972. The order also authorised the notification of the decision to Eurid, the EU association in charge of the registration of the .eu domain names, and to ELB Multimedia, the registration body.

The President of the Court ruled that ‘Elite’ is a well-known trademark under Article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, which provides that: “Any person who uses a mark enjoying repute for goods or services that are not similar to those designated in the registration shall be liable under civil law if such use is likely to cause a prejudice to the owner of the mark or if such use constitutes unjustified exploitation of the mark.”

However, whereas Elite Model Management claimed 75.000 Euros damages for the illegal use of its trademark, the President only granted 1.000 Euros, since Elite neither explained nor brought evidence as to the prejudice it had suffered, for example, by providing evidence relating to the traffic on the websites of the defendants.

In previous cases, Elite Model Management had already obtained the transfer of the domain names ‘elite-models.org’, ‘elitemodel.org’ and ‘elitemodel.cc’.


http://www.legalis.net


BRAD SPITZ
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RSS Feeds and Liability Under French Law

RSS (or Really Simple Syndication) is a family of Web feed formats used to publish frequently updated content. This format can be particularly useful for blog entries, news headlines or podcasts, because the feed is permanently updated and the latest content is automatically displayed.

An RSS file or document usually contains the title of the news, a short description or a summary and a hyperlink to an associated website which hosts the article.

The visitors interested in that content can click on the hyperlink. They will then be redirected and have access to the full text on the main website which hosts the news. Thus, with the RSS feeds, a website is able to broadcast its content easily and can attract new Internet users.

To read the RSS content, the user needs software called “RSS reader” or “feed reader”. The user subscribes to a feed by entering the feed's link into the reader, or by clicking an RSS icon in a browser that initiates the subscription process (The definition of RSS can be found at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSS). The RSS feeds are part of what it currently called Web 2.0. They are widespread and appreciated by webmasters.

However, the automatic nature of the RSS format is not always a good thing for the user, nor is the use of the RSS feeds risk-free. Indeed, a hyperlink can lead to an article which violates the law. News often deals with the private life of celebrities, and Internet makes that kind of infringement even more visible. Therefore, can a webmaster be liable for an RSS feed which violates the law, even though the content is automatically displayed and comes from another website?

The question has been submitted to the French Courts very recently. Before examining the rulings, we can quickly sum up the applicable legislation.

The main issue concerns the status of the user who has subscribed to the RSS feeds. Is he a hosting provider or a publisher?

If he is a hosting provider, he will then be liable on the grounds of the article 6-I-2 of the French Act on Confidence in the Digital Environment, adopted on 21 June 2004. This article provides that a hosting provider may not be held liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service if he is unaware of illegal content, and if having knowledge of such content, he has immediately acted to remove it or to disable access to the information.

On the contrary, if he is a publisher, he will then be liable on the grounds of the article 6-III-1 of the same Act which refers either to tort law (that is to say Article 1382 of the French Civil Code) or to the Freedom of the Press Act adopted on 29 July 1881, if the violation of the law is a press offence.

In other words, if the user of the RSS feeds is a hosting provider, he is only liable under certain circumstances. If he is a publisher, he will be liable for his acts if they cause damage to another party.

Three cases concerning RSS feeds have been tried so far.

First, a summary judgement issued by the High Court of First Instance of Nanterre, on 28 February 2008 ( http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tginanterre20080228.pdf; S. Rouja, «Responsabilité pour les flux RSS, la prudence est de mise !», http://www.juriscom.net/actu/visu.php?ID=1032). In this case, a hyperlink on the website “lespipoles.com” referred to an article published on the website “gala.fr” about a love story between a French movie director and an American actress. The French director sued the owner of the domain name, Mr D.

According to the plaintiff, Mr D. had intentionally decided to subscribe to the RSS feed and to create a link referring to a specific website: “gala.fr”. Therefore, he had the status of publisher.

The respondent argued that the website only gathers news headlines collected from other websites. Those headlines are displayed automatically and he does not check them before they appear on the screen. That is to say that he has no control over the content. He is only a hosting provider, according to Article 6-I-2 of the French Act on Confidence in the Digital Environment. Consequently, he argued that the plaintiff should rather have written to him and asked for the removal of the links than bringing an action before Court, as provided in the Act.

In this case, the Court ruled that Mr D. had the status of publisher because he had subscribed to a RSS feed. Furthermore, his website deals with a very specific theme (the private life of famous people) and the links were organized in a specific manner.


The second decision was issued by the same Court, on 7 March 2008 ( http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tginanterre20080307.pdf). The situation was almost the same as the previous one. The action was brought before the Court by the same plaintiff, but this time the respondent was the website “wikio.fr”. The judges declared that they were not competent for this litigation because the respondent, owner of the domain name, was not appointed by the legal mentions on the website as the hosting provider, the publisher or the webmaster. Therefore the plaintiff decided to sue Wikio directly (M. Rees, “Agrégateurs de flux RSS : Wikio.fr une nouvelle fois attaqué”, http://www.pcinpact.com/actu/news/43143-wikio-olivier-dahan-flux-RSS.htm ).

Finally, a very recent summary judgment was issued by the President of the High Court of First Instance of Paris, on 26 March 2008 (most commonly known as the “Fuzz” case, http://www.juriscom.net/documents/tginanterre20080307.pdf). In this case, again, a website was hosting a link concerning the private life of a French actor. The President adopted the same reasoning as in the first case. He ruled that the respondent acted as a publisher by deliberately selecting the websites and organizing the links in a specific way. He condemned him for infringement of private life on the grounds of Article 9 of the French Civil Code. The webmaster has decided to lodge an appeal.

For the time being, any user of RSS feeds is liable for the content of the news which appears on his website, even if the whole text is hosted on another website.

These decisions have not been well received by the webmasters, though they have one positive aspect: they illustrate the uncertainty about the notion of publishing in French law ( http://www.pcinpact.com/actu/news/42436-LCEN-digg-like.htm). Some authors consider that such decisions question the acronym RSS (really simple syndication) and others even think that they threaten the French Web 2.0 (M. Rees, «Le web 2.0 français menacé? », http://www.pcinpact.com/actu/news/42403-fuzz-acteur-presse-citron-LCEN.htm).


FRANCOIS KAWACIW


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La spécialisation des juridictions : concentrer d’abord, réfléchir après

Editorial publié dans La Lettre des Juristes d'Affaires (LJA) du 10 mars 2008


La spécialisation des juridictions a été renforcée dans deux domaines importants et d’une grande technicité : le droit de la concurrence et la propriété intellectuelle. S’agissant du droit de la concurrence, la loi NRE avait attribué les litiges relatifs aux articles L.420-1 à L.420-5 du Code de commerce et 81 et 82 du Traité CE aux tribunaux de grande instance et tribunaux de commerce de 8 villes désignés dans un décret entré en vigueur le 1er janvier 2006. En matière de propriété intellectuelle, la loi sur la lutte contre la contrefaçon de 2007 a prévu une spécialisation des tribunaux de grande instance. Le décret qui désignera les tribunaux compétents est attendu.

Si les raisons ayant inspiré ces spécialisations sont louables –il s’agit notamment de faire de la France une place de droit efficace et attractive, avec une justice d’excellence et hautement spécialisée–, leur réussite dépend non seulement des moyens qui seront mis en œuvre (formation des juges, réorganisation interne, création de pôles de propriété intellectuelle, stabilisation des magistrats…), mais aussi, en amont, de la cohérence des textes instituant la spécialisation. Or, on est frappé par les difficultés d’ordre procédural laissées en suspens, notamment lorsque la compétence spéciale est invoquée par voie d’exception ou dans le cadre de procédures complexes.

On peut ainsi se demander si, en matière de concurrence, lorsqu’une action sera introduite sur un double fondement devant un tribunal non visé par le décret, et dans le cas où le défendeur soulèverait l’exception d’incompétence, il devra être fait application de l’adage selon lequel l’accessoire suit le principal (comme cela a été fait récemment par le Tribunal de commerce de Nanterre). Cette solution permettrait à la juridiction initialement saisie de conserver l’affaire et d’éviter une instrumentalisation des nouvelles règles à des fins dilatoires. Doit-on au contraire, de manière plus cohérente, appliquer la règle selon laquelle les exceptions s’interprètent strictement, dans la mesure où les règles instituant la spécialisation dérogent au droit commun ?

En tout état de cause, lorsqu’une affaire est introduite devant un tribunal qui n’est pas visé par le décret, et si le défendeur ne soulève pas in limine litis l’incompétence, il semblerait que l’affaire doive rester devant cette juridiction. La Cour d’appel de Paris, devenue juridiction unique d’appel à compétence nationale, et qui a donc désormais un rôle unificateur dans l’application des principes du droit de la concurrence, verra alors, semble-t-il, lui échapper les affaires traitées (à tort ?) par les juridictions non spécialisées de première instance.

La nouvelle loi sur propriété intellectuelle pose également des questions de cohérence. Alors que la volonté du législateur était de transférer à un petit nombre de TGI, à l’exclusion des tribunaux de commerce, les contentieux pour tous les droits de propriété intellectuelle, s’agissant du droit d’auteur, la loi a limité le nombre de TGI, tout en maintenant la compétence de l’ensemble des tribunaux de commerce (l’art. L.331-1 al. 1 CPI n’est pas abrogé). Doit-on considérer qu’il s’agit d’un oubli, et exclure la compétence des tribunaux de commerce ? Ou a-t-on considéré que le droit d’auteur peut être appliqué par n’importe juge consulaire, alors que le magistrat professionnel doit lui être spécialisé ? Par ailleurs, la nouvelle loi ne donne pas de précision s’agissant de la situation dans laquelle une même affaire mêlera, comme c’est souvent le cas, droit d’auteur et droit des dessins et modèles.

Il est à craindre que tant qu’il n’aura pas corrigé ses incohérences, le législateur n’atteigne pas le but poursuivi.


BRAD SPITZ
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Google Adwords Condemned Again For Trademark Infringement

Court of Appeal of Paris (4th Chamber, Section B), 1 February 2008, De Dietrich, Electrolux, and others v. Google France and Google Inc.


Google Inc is incorporated in the US and exploits a programme called Adwords, which displays banner advertisements (‘commercial links’) when a particular search term is entered in the Google search engine. Google France was incorporated in France in 2002.

GIFAM, a trade association in the field of household equipment, and the holders of trademarks (such as De Dietrich, Electrolux, Hoover, etc…), brought an action on the grounds of trademark infringement against Google Inc and Google France, which was dismissed by the High Court of First Instance of Paris (12 July 2006, GIFAM and others v. Google France).

The plaintiffs argued that the Adwords system infringes on their trademarks as it uses a keyword generator and broadcasts advertisements that may lead the public to believe that the advertisers are related to the companies who own the trademarks. Moreover, they claimed that the Google companies infringed on their rights to their corporate names and their domain names, and committed acts of misleading advertising by using ‘commercial links’ and carrying out classifications of the trademarks that lead consumers to misrepresent the relationships that the companies may have with the sites of the advertisers who use their trademarks illegally. They lodged an appeal against the High Court’s judgement that had dismissed their action.

The Court of Appeal, in its decision dated 1 February 2008, reversed the High Court’s judgement, stating that the Adwords system is a public service that is ‘contextual advertising’, in which the Google companies play an active role. They may not, therefore, be considered as hosting providers in the meaning of Article 6 the French Act of 21 June 2004 on Confidence in the Digital Environment (which implemented the Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services - ‘Directive on electronic commerce’).

The Court considered that with the Adwords service, Google acts as an advertising provider, and that a large part of its profits is related to the frequency with which the advertiser’s website is consulted. Furthermore, Google is responsible for the trademarks appearing with the products or services in question on the screens of the Internet users.

The Court rejected Google’s arguments. Google’s defence was that the service works in a purely statistical way, and solely at the request of the advertisers. Indeed, the Court considered that it was Google who put this system in place, that it knew how it worked, and that it offered its use to the advertisers. Moreover, the fact that the advertisers were warned by announcements displayed on the pages of the Adwords system is irrelevant since Google chose to reproduce the trademarks.

The Court of Appeal therefore ruled that Google’s use of the trademarks breaches Article L.713-2 of the French Intellectual Property Code, which prohibits the reproduction, use or affixing of a trademark, or the use of a reproduced trademark for goods or services that are identical to those designated in the registration. The Court underlined that Google did not challenge the fact that the trademarks were identical to those reproduced in the lists provided by the keyword generator.

This is not the first French decision condemning the Google Adwords system. In a decision dated 6 December 2007, the Court of Appeal of Aix en Provence ruled that the use of the keyword ‘Remote-Anything’ (a registered trademark) in connection with the same types of products as those protected by the trademark, without the authorisation of the owner of the trademark, is act of infringement of the said trademark. The Court underlined that Google Inc and Google France had played an active role, and could not be considered as mere ‘technical providers’. Since they displayed advertising messages in the form of commercial links for advertisers who paid them for these services, they were to be held liable under trademark law. In particular, they approved the chosen keywords (a choice which is made by the advertisers with Google’s assistance) and were supposed to verify that the commercial links did not infringe any rights of third parties. Moreover, they could not allege that it was impossible to carry out such verification beforehand for supposedly material, legal and economic reasons. The Court added that even if it had been established that it was impossible to carry out such verification, Google Inc and Google France had to either simply abandon this activity or bear the consequences attached (see our blog: http://copyrightfrance.blogspot.com/2008/01/google-adwords-condemned-for-trademark.html).

http://www.juriscom.net/jpt/visu.php?ID=1021


BRAD SPITZ
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